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Abstract Numerous studies have found that selective attention affects category learning. However, previous research did not distinguish between the contribution of focusing and filtering components of selective attention. This study addresses this issue by examining how components of selective attention affect category representation. Participants first learned a rule‐plus‐similarity category structure, and then were presented with category priming followed by categorization and recognition tests. Additionally, to evaluate the involvement of focusing and filtering, we fit models with different attentional mechanisms to the data. In Experiment 1, participants received rule‐based category training, with specific emphasis on a single deterministic feature (D feature). Experiment 2 added a recognition test to examine participants’ memory for features. Both experiments indicated that participants categorized items based solely on the D feature, showed greater memory for the D feature, were primed exclusively by the D feature without interference from probabilistic features (P features), and were better fit by models with focusing and at least one type of filtering mechanism. The results indicated that selective attention distorted category representation by highlighting the D feature and attenuating P features. To examine whether the distorted representation was specific to rule‐based training, Experiment 3 introduced training, emphasizing all features. Under such training, participants were no longer primed by the D feature, they remembered all features well, and they were better fit by the model assuming only focusing but no filtering process. The results coupled with modeling provide novel evidence that while both focusing and filtering contribute to category representation, filtering can also result in representational distortion. 

Evidence-accumulation models (EAMs) are powerful tools for making sense of human and animal decision-making behavior. EAMs have generated significant theoretical advances in psychology, behavioral economics, and cognitive neuroscience and are increasingly used as a measurement tool in clinical research and other applied settings. Obtaining valid and reliable inferences from EAMs depends on knowing how to establish a close match between model assumptions and features of the task/data to which the model is applied. However, this knowledge is rarely articulated in the EAM literature, leaving beginners to rely on the private advice of mentors and colleagues and inefficient trial-and-error learning. In this article, we provide practical guidance for designing tasks appropriate for EAMs, relating experimental manipulations to EAM parameters, planning appropriate sample sizes, and preparing data and conducting an EAM analysis. Our advice is based on prior methodological studies and the our substantial collective experience with EAMs. By encouraging good task-design practices and warning of potential pitfalls, we hope to improve the quality and trustworthiness of future EAM research and applications. 

When making decisions based on probabilistic outcomes, people guide their behavior using knowledge gathered through both indirect descriptions and direct experience. Paradoxically, how people obtain information significantly impacts apparent preferences. A ubiquitous example is the description-experience gap: individuals seemingly overweight low probability events when probabilities are described yet underweight them when probabilities must be experienced firsthand. A leading explanation for this fundamental gap in decision-making is that probabilities are weighted differently when learned through description relative to experience, yet a formal theoretical account of the mechanism responsible for such weighting differences remains elusive. We demonstrate how various learning and memory retention models incorporating neuroscientifically motivated learning mechanisms can explain why probability weighting and valuation parameters often are found to vary across description and experience. In a simulation study, we show how learning through experience can lead to systematically biased estimates of probability weighting when using a traditional cumulative prospect theory model. We then use hierarchical Bayesian modeling and Bayesian model comparison to show how various learning and memory retention models capture participants’ behavior over and above changes in outcome valuation and probability weighting, accounting for description and experience-based decisions in a within-subject experiment. We conclude with a discussion of how substantive models of psychological processes can lead to insights that heuristic statistical models fail to capture. 

Abstract In this article, we propose a two-step pipeline to explore task-dependent functional coactivations of brain clusters with constraints from the structural connectivity network. In the first step, the pipeline employs a nonparametric Bayesian clustering method that can estimate the optimal number of clusters, cluster assignments of brain regions of interest (ROIs), and the strength of within- and between-cluster connections without any prior knowledge. In the second step, a factor analysis model is applied to functional data with factors defined as the obtained structural clusters and the factor structure informed by the structural network. The coactivations of ROIs and their clusters can be studied by correlations between factors, which can largely differ by ongoing cognitive task. We provide a simulation study to validate that the pipeline can recover the underlying structural and functional network. We also apply the proposed pipeline to empirical data to explore the structural network of ROIs obtained by the Gordon parcellation and study their functional coactivations across eight cognitive tasks and a resting-state condition. 

Abstract To accurately categorize items, humans learn to selectively attend to the stimulus dimensions that are most relevant to the task. Models of category learning describe how attention changes across trials as labeled stimuli are progressively observed. The Adaptive Attention Representation Model (AARM), for example, provides an account in which categorization decisions are based on the perceptual similarity of a new stimulus to stored exemplars, and dimension-wise attention is updated on every trial in the direction of a feedback-based error gradient. As such, attention modulation as described by AARM requires interactions among processes of orienting, visual perception, memory retrieval, prediction error, and goal maintenance to facilitate learning. The current study explored the neural bases of attention mechanisms using quantitative predictions from AARM to analyze behavioral and fMRI data collected while participants learned novel categories. Generalized linear model analyses revealed patterns of BOLD activation in the parietal cortex (orienting), visual cortex (perception), medial temporal lobe (memory retrieval), basal ganglia (prediction error), and pFC (goal maintenance) that covaried with the magnitude of model-predicted attentional tuning. Results are consistent with AARM's specification of attention modulation as a dynamic property of distributed cognitive systems.